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The work of Panama's José de Jesús "Chuchu" Martínez fits 
comfortably among the Latin American dramas of the 1950s and 1960s that 
moved away "from the social problems of a Spanish American reality to 
universal metaphysical preoccupations" (Woodyard 186). In Chuchú's work, 
those preoccupations are principally existential. Indeed, his work has been 
praised for evoking existential anguish in the face of a meaningless universe 
(Quackenbush 55-56; Rodríguez-Sardinas and Suárez Radillo 372; Solórzano 
156). Existential anguish certainly appears in Chuchú's 1961 drama Caifas, 
but Caifas goes far beyond such anguish by contributing to recent discussions 
about subjectivity. That is, Caifas expresses support for "situated subjectivity" 
(Kruks 11), an essentially existentialist subjectivity that occupies a middle 
ground between humanism and anti-humanism. Caifas supports this 
subjectivity through an arresting allegory of faith. This paper reviews 
existentialist, anti-humanist and humanist accounts of subjectivity, then 
demonstrates how Caifas creatively employs an allegory of faith to ground 
the human agency required for situated subjectivity. 
To begin, a brief plot summary is in order. Caifas unfolds as 
characters confront the problem of evil: Jewish leader Caiaphas, recognizing 
that his people cannot reconcile the coexistence of human suffering and a 
just God, invents a way for them to do so. Caiaphas' plan involves a big lie in 
which he frames a Nazarene "charlatan" named Jesus (Martinez 80). 
Interestingly, Caiaphas' framing of Jesus does not simply involve accusing 
Jesus of a crime. Instead, Caiaphas ensures that Jesus satisfies all messianic 
prophecies; he then manipulates the Jewish community to demand Jesus' 
death. After doing so, Caiaphas convinces his people that their miserable 
lives reflect a just God's punishment for killing the Messiah. 
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Existential Redemption 
Caifas ends as Caiaphas learns that his big lie is absolutely successful. 
Specifically, a new widow named Martha appears at the temple. Martha 
was a member of the crowd who demanded Jesus' crucifixion. Her 
appearance at the temple, however, has nothing to do with that incident. 
Instead, she has come to complain that in addition to her husband's recent 
death, her only son has just died. When the assistant priest - at Caiaphas' 
behest - tells her that Jesus was the Son of God, she responds as follows: 
"And I helped to kill him! No wonder my own son died, since I was killing the 
Son of God at the time. Now I see! Oh, forgive me, Lord!" (Martinez 95).l 
Martha's statement shows that Caiaphas' big lie has successfully 
redeemed God in the people's eyes. Nevertheless, God remains unredeemed 
- not demonstrably just - in Caiaphas' own view. This view reflects that of 
many existentialist thinkers, who argue that God's existence is irrelevant to 
the human condition. The world, in other words, contains no givens other 
than one's own existence. This lack of a pre-ordained self or purpose explains 
Sartre's oft-repeated maxim that "existence precedes essence" (Sartre, 
"Humanism" 349). Rather than having a pre-ordained self, says Sartre, humans 
first encounter themselves as already existing in a particular situation. To 
illustrate this point in "Existentialism Is a Humanism," Sartre contrasts the 
human condition with that of a paper knife. When we see a paper knife, he 
says, we see that an artisan conceived its design and use; furthermore, we 
see that the artisan manufactured it according to known production techniques. 
All of these factors coalesced before the paper knife came into existence. 
This coalescence means that the paper knife's essence - its conception and 
production - preceded its existence. 
Having made this point, Sartre notes that a particular view of humanity 
likewise - and mistakenly - treats humans as if their essence precedes their 
existence. That view involves God as the creator, the "supernal artisan" 
(348). If people mistakenly assume that such an artisan exists, says Sartre, 
then they must likewise mistakenly conclude that human essence necessarily 
precedes its existence. Interestingly, Sartre sees this same "mistaken" 
perspective even in purportedly atheistic philosophies of the eighteenth 
century: statements about "human nature," he says, suggest that each person 
represents "a particular example of a universal conception, the conception of 
Man" (348). 
Sartre rejects these universalizing views (essence preceding 
existence) by adopting a particularizing view that focuses on individual 
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situations. Sartre labels this view, which eliminates an artisan God, as "atheistic 
existentialism" (349). By eliminating the artisan, Sartre finds support for the 
proposition that human existence precedes its essence. Most important, Sartre 
finds justification for a radical view of human freedom: 
Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in 
consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon 
either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is 
without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will 
never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and 
specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism -
man is free, man is freedom. (353) 
The foregoing shows how Sartre views people as both absolutely free and 
absolutely responsible. People are free to create themselves, but they are 
also "without excuse" - responsible for the choices they make in a meaningless 
world. 
In Caifas, the Jewish leader agrees with Sartre that the world is 
meaningless. Unlike Sartre, however, Caiaphas does not posit a godless 
universe. Rather, he concludes that God is effectively absent. Caiaphas does 
so because he cannot resolve the problem of evil - the coexistence of evil 
and a just God. In the prologue, for example, Caiaphas attempts to comfort 
the widowed Martha after her husband's death. The husband (Samuel) was 
a young and righteous man. When Martha asks Caiaphas why God made 
her husband die, Caiaphas answers that all people die and that the spirits of 
the righteous move on to dwell in God's presence. Martha responds that she 
cannot live without Samuel. Furthermore, she insists that neither she nor 
Samuel deserves to die. Upon hearing this, Caiaphas gets angry: 
CAIAPHAS: Have you searched your heart deeply enough to say 
something like that, to say that you don't deserve 
this punishment? Is your life - and Samuel's - so 
pure and free of sin that you can justify such insolence 
before your creator? Have you searched your heart 
to that extent, Martha? 
MARTHA: Search it yourself, Your Excellency. Search it 
yourself and tell me. I have no secrets. 
CAIAPHAS: Confused. At any rate, even if your heart was pure, 
you'd still be the daughter of a woman. And as such 
you have inherited the sins of your parents. (19) 
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In the face of Martha's challenge, "Search it yourself," Caiaphas begins to 
doubt his own arguments. Nevertheless, he answers Martha's challenge with 
a traditional response: we die to pay for the sins of Adam and Eve and all 
those who have lived before us. Furthermore, Caiaphas affirms the justice of 
God: 
CAIAPHAS: It's possible that you don't comprehend it, but God 
is just. And if he has decided that Samuel should 
die, you can be sure that he has acted justly. 
MARTHA: What do you mean "acted justly"? What kind of 
justice kills Samuel, the best man on earth, the most 
humble? 
CAIAPHAS: Divine justice. 
MARTHA: Well I want human justice. (20) 
Martha wants human justice because divine justice appears arbitrary. At 
least human justice, she reasons, attempts to explain itself logically: a law 
exists, and one must suffer the consequences for breaking that law. Human 
justice, therefore, is based upon personal responsibility. Because the divine 
justice that Caiaphas describes is not based upon personal responsibility, 
Martha rejects it. 
After visiting with Martha, Caiaphas recognizes that he cannot 
reconcile the coexistence of a just God and death. While Caiaphas repeatedly 
affirms his belief in God and in an eternal spiritual life, he simultaneously 
affirms that he cannot justify death. He later discusses the problem with his 
assistant, Saul. Saul says that he simply believes God is just; Saul explains, 
however, that he bases his belief on his heart, not on logic. Caiaphas responds 
that the ability to believe without understanding explains why Saul is a priest. 
Nevertheless, Caiaphas knows that the people he serves, like the newly 
widowed Martha, cannot believe without understanding. They need an 
explanation for life and its suffering that comports with a just God. Such an 
explanation would satisfy Martha's demand for human justice. 
Because Caiaphas becomes convinced that no such explanation 
exists, he decides to invent his big lie about Jesus as the Messiah. By 
convincing the Jews that they have killed the Messiah, Caiaphas hopes to 
create such remorse that his people will accept life's miseries as the 
punishment of a just God. The Jews will therefore accept God's justice and 
his involvement in their daily lives. God will no longer be absent to them. 
Notwithstanding his effort to make God present to his people, Caiaphas 
himself sides with Sartre, at least concerning human freedom. Specifically, 
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the fact of death clearly convinces Caiaphas that humanity is nothing to God. 
Furthermore, Caiaphas seems willing to affirm that God is nothing to him, at 
least as far as his personal choices are concerned. That is, in a twist on 
Sartre's philosophy, Caiaphas affirms God's existence but insists on his own 
freedom to act. Caiaphas' final words, a resigned and bitterly ironic form of 
the Lord's Prayer, illustrate his attitude: 
Our Father, who art in heaven, behold our deception: Jesus has died 
to redeem thee in the poor consciences of men. Behold our scheme 
to ensure that men could worship thee and find this miserable life 
more bearable. Go meet them. Go find these poor men who are 
guided to thee by a lie, yet travel the road of humility, resignation, 
and repentance. May thy name be blessed among the blessed, and 
may the works of thy hands be considered just in the eyes of men. 
Amen. (96) 
Caiaphas' bitter prayer reflects his determination to create meaning 
in a world rendered meaningless by God's absence. The last line of the prayer 
underscores this determination: "May the works of thy hands be considered 
just in the eyes of men." Of course, Caiaphas finds no objective reason to 
believe that God is just. Indeed, he believes the only way his people can 
consider God just is if they accept the "big lie" about Jesus. That lie provides 
meaning for Caiaphas' flock. The lie itself, however, means nothing to 
Caiaphas. Rather, he gives his own life meaning by creating the lie. Creating 
the lie represents Caiaphas' decision to act on his own: the meaning resides 
in the action. 
While Caiaphas' effort to create meaning reflects existentialist 
thought, existentialists do not label life meaningless or absurd simply because 
God seems absent (or dead). Instead, existentialist absurdity flows from the 
foundation for human choices. Specifically, existentialists argue that unlike 
plants or rocks, humans have the capacity to care about how they live their 
lives. Humans, that is, can adopt an attitude toward life, an attitude that 
Sartre calls a "choice" (Being and Nothingness 480). This attitude or 
"fimdamental choice" (Cooper 143) grounds each person's beliefs about right 
and wrong, important and unimportant. 
The existentialist's "fundamental choice" - the decision to take a 
stand - makes genuine human existence possible. Sartre asserts that this 
fundamental choice, however, is itself unjustified. This unjustifiability supports 
the existentialist premise that life is absurd: 
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Precisely here because we are dealing with a choice, this choice as 
it is made indicates in general other choices as possibles. The 
possibility of these other choices is neither made explicit nor posited, 
but it is lived in the feeling of unjustifiability; and it is this which is 
expressed by the fact of the absurdity of my choice and consequently 
of my being. {Being and Nothingness 479-80) 
While the fundamental choice's unjustifiability supports the claim 
that life is absurd, unjustifiability does not fully explain existentialist absurdity. 
Rather, as David Cooper notes, existentialist absurdity flows from the "tension" 
between the unjustified fundamental choice and "the seriousness of 
engagement with the world" (143). Cooper cites Thomas Nagel for a lucid 
description of this tension: 
We cannot live human lives without energy and attention, nor without 
making choices which show that we take some things more seriously 
than others. Yet we have always available a point of view outside 
the particular form of our lives, from which the seriousness appears 
gratuitous. These two inescapable viewpoints collide in us, and that 
is what makes life absurd. It is absurd because we ignore the doubts 
that we know cannot be settled, continuing to live with nearly 
undiminished seriousness in spite of them. (Nagel 14, as cited in 
Cooper 143) 
Living "with nearly undiminished seriousness" despite life's absurdity is the 
existentialist project. In other words, existentialist thought requires humans 
to create their own meaning precisely because life is absurd. Creating such 
meaning, however, requires making choices in a particular way. That way is 
generally labeled "authenticity" (Guignon 499-500). 
"Authenticity" concerns remaining true to the fundamental choice to live 
"with nearly undiminished seriousness" about one's own existence. People 
demonstrate their faithfulness, their authenticity, in two ways: 1) by exercising 
agency according to the guiding principles that flow from the fundamental 
choice; and 2) by accepting responsibility for exercising agency (Stott 77-
78). In Caifas, Jesus embodies authenticity. That authenticity appears 
repeatedly in Jesus' decision-making. The motives behind Jesus' decisions 
are made obvious, even though Jesus does not actually appear on stage. In 
the prologue, for example, the widowed Martha sends a boy to find Jesus so 
that he can raise her husband from the dead. When Jesus and the boy arrive 
at Martha's door, however, Caiaphas is already there. The following exchange 
takes place: 










MARTHA: What? Come here. 
BOY: Take it. He didn't want it. He returns the piece of 
jewelry to her. He said that the poor who follow 
him are rich...or something like that. 
Without showing the interest that she would have 
shown before. He didn't want to come? 
He's here. He's outside at the front door, waiting 
for you. Martha, surprised, looks at the boy for 
a second. She then moves to a spot where she 
can see the front door, which is somewhere stage 
right and out of the audience s view. 
She stares enthralled at the spot where Jesus 
would be. Is that him? 
Yes. 
Martha! She doesn 't hear him. 
How did you find him so quickly? You just left! 
I don't know...He was coming down the road. 
Surprised, but unable to take her eyes off Jesus. 
He was coming here, then? 
BOY: No. I don't know. There were a lot of people with 
him, but he told them to go away. 
CAIAPHAS: Scornfully, looking at Jesus for a moment. And 
isn't this the one who likes to perform miracles in 
front of lots of people? Why did he tell them to leave? 
(25-26) 
The answer to Caiaphas' sarcastic question is implicit: Jesus sent his followers 
away because he did not perform miracles for his own benefit. Furthermore, 
he refused to keep the jewel Martha had sent as payment. These actions 
underscore the existentialists' authentic life: acting because we choose to 
act. 
In the context oí Caifas, authentic living could be termed "existential 
redemption." In the play, however, only Jesus and Caiaphas achieve such 
redemption. Specifically, both Jesus and Caiaphas represent characters who 
exercise choice and take responsibility for agency, thus redeeming themselves 
from the inauthentic life of those who confuse their everyday activities with 
genuine living. That redemption, however, does not necessarily bring 
happiness. For Jesus, redemption - living the existentialist's authentic life -
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brings death; for Caiaphas, redemption brings bitterness. Nevertheless, the 
actions of both characters provoke existential questions about how humans 
engage the world. 
Constructing Ideology 
The existentialist questions that the play provokes are set against a 
backdrop dear to Marxists: the construction of ideology. Indeed, Caiaphas' 
construction of the "big lie" dovetails easily with Louis Althusser's well-
known description of how ideology works. In "Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses," Althusser describes how the ruling classes employ ideology 
to ensure the lower classes' voluntary submission to the existing order. 
Ideology is successful, says Althusser, because it creates certain 
"obviousnesses" (171-72). In particular, the "obviousness" that people are 
subjects - agents capable of acting and taking responsibility for action - "is 
an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect" (172). Furthermore, 
while ideology creates subjects, Althusser notes that the term subject has 
another meaning: submission to higher authority. Ideology, therefore, creates 
agents yet also makes them submissive. Specifically, individuals submit to 
the authority of that which centers ideology: the "Absolute Subject" (180). 
This center or Absolute Subject will vary depending on what kind of societal 
structure is involved. The Absolute Subject centering religion, however, is 
readily identified; that Subject is God. 
Althusser asserts that as an Absolute Subject, God creates both 
subjects and subjection: "[T]hose who have recognized God, and have 
recognized themselves in Him, will be saved" (180). In essence, the Absolute 
Subject tells individuals who they are. By recognizing who they are and 
behaving as the Absolute Subject desires, subjects are guaranteed that 
"everything will be all right: Amen - 'So be it'" (181). The prayer-word 
"Amen" shows the subjects' belief that reality must exist as religious ideology 
has constructed it. Althusser argues that all ideology, however, invokes 
something similar to this "Amen" or "So be it." 
In Caifas, the "Amen" appears at the end of the play when the 
widow Martha exclaims: "No wonder my own son died, since I was killing 
the Son of God at the time. Now I see! Oh, forgive me, Lord!" (95). Martha's 
anguished yet paradoxically relieved cry reflects her response to Caiaphas' 
new ideology. That new ideology allows Martha to reconcile the co-existence 
of evil (her son's death) and a just God in human terms. Earlier in the play, 
Martha had demanded "human justice." Caiaphas' new ideology provides 
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such justice by affixing a punishment (death) to the crime of killing the 
Messiah. As Caiaphas hoped, Martha now believes she knows who she is. 
She now understands that in spite of death, God is just. In fact, she accepts 
God's justice not in spite of death but rather because of death. Death is 
simply a just punishment for killing the Son of a just God. 
An Existential Framework for Subjectivity and Agency 
A. An Interpretive Paradox 
While Caiaphas' "big lie" hails his flock into the new religious ideology 
he desires, that ideology simultaneously appears to create an interpretive 
paradox. That is, Caifas contains a strong claim for achieving existential 
redemption through agency. Such agency, the ability to make choices and 
accept responsibility for doing so, appears to imply the existence of 
autonomous subjects. The very idea of autonomous subjectivity, however, 
has been severely criticized by anti-humanists like Althusser. As noted 
previously, Althusser argues that subjectivity is "an ideological effect, the 
elementary ideological effect" (46). If Althusser is right, then no autonomous 
subject capable of exercising agency can exist. Indeed, anti-humanists have 
consistently attacked existentialist accounts of agency on this very basis 
(Guignon 500). Thus the apparent paradox in Caifas: the play advocates 
human agency even as the protagonist employs ideology to create the 
"elementary ideological effect" of subjectivity. How, one asks, can autonomous 
subjects genuinely exercise agency if subjectivity is simply an "effect"? 
B. Situated Subjectivity: Finding a Middle Ground between Humanism 
and Anti-Humanism 
The foregoing question assumes an either/or stance: subjectivity is 
either autonomous or constructed (an "effect"). This either/or stance reflects 
the disagreement between humanist and anti-humanist views of subjectivity. 
Humanists, for example, posit an "unencumbered" (Kruks 7) subjectivity 
featuring "consciousness" and "agency" (Soper 12). In contrast, postmodern 
or anti-humanist theorists emphasize the social construction of subjectivity. 
The social structures or systems of thought that construct subjectivity may 
be discourse practices (Foucault), the play of signs (Derrida), or ideology 
(Althusser), but anti-humanists would nevertheless agree that subjectivity is 
constructed. This anti-humanist notion of purely constructed subjectivity cannot 
be reconciled with humanism's unencumbered subjectivity. 
While one cannot reconcile humanist and anti-humanist views of 
subjectivity, neither can one consistently choose either view over the other. 
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As Sonia Kruks points out, consistently choosing one of these views invites 
"persuasive criticism from the other" (7). Specifically, strict humanism does 
not explain the social structures that shape subjectivity, while strict anti-
humanism never completely eliminates autonomous subjectivity. If one cannot 
consistently choose either view, however, what option remains? Soper 
suggests that the "best we can offer" is to affirm the "interdependence" of 
subjects and structures (151). This answer suggests a middle ground between 
humanism and anti-humanism, although Soper does not explore the issue 
further. Kruks, however, does precisely that. She describes this middle ground 
as "the hypothesis that subjectivity is at once constituting and constituted, 
that structures (discursive practices, systems of signifiers, or what you will) 
act and re-act upon each other, so that we must talk of an 'encumbered' 
subjectivity and 'human' structures" (7). Kruks labels this middle ground 
"situated subjectivity" (11), a notion based on French existentialism. 
The reason existentialists favor situated subjectivity over unencumbered 
subjectivity lies in what Cooper calls the "main tenet of existential 
phenomenology": "[N]o sense can be made of mind except as engaged, 
through embodied activity, in a world which cannot, therefore, be contained 
'inside' it" (16). This concept of embodied activity indicates that human beings 
are always engaged in the world. They act in a time and a place, "always 
embedded in a situation" (Guignon 496). The world human beings encounter, 
however, is not the world as viewed by a detached scientific observer. Rather, 
the world is fundamentally human. Within this human world, we are inextricably 
intertwined - "always already," in Heidegger's terms (157) - with whatever 
confronts us. Our choices, therefore, create our experience of the world 
even as the world informs our choices. 
The subjectivity encompassed by the foregoing contrasts deeply with 
both humanism and anti-humanism. As noted earlier, humanism advocates 
transparent (constituting) subjectivity, while anti-humanism advocates 
constructed (constituted) subjectivity. Existentialism's situated subjectivity, 
however, avoids theses two extremes. Indeed, by noting how our choices 
create our experience of the world even as the world informs our choices, 
situated subjectivity reflects "a relation of mutual permeability between 
subjectivity and its surrounding world" (Kruks 11). 
A Divine Jesus As an Allegory of Faith 
Section IV above outlines an interpretive paradox in Caifas. That paradox 
concerns agency. Specifically, Caifas makes a strong claim for agency even 
FALL 2006 89 
as the protagonist employs ideology to create the "elementary ideological 
effect" of subjectivity. This paradox finds a partial resolution in situated 
subjectivity. That is, because situated subjectivity posits mutual permeability 
between subjectivity and the world, the competing ideas in Caifas can co-
exist to some degree. In other words, situated subjectivity allows human 
agency even though subjectivity may be shaped by social structures, including 
ideology. Thus, situated subjectivity provides an avenue to escape Caifas' 
apparent interpretive paradox. Presumably, however, situated subjectivity could 
do so for any existentialist work. The value oí Caifas, therefore, does not lie 
in the fact that it is an existentialist work. Rather, the play's value lies in its 
innovative response to those, like Althusser, who reject the possibility of 
agency. That response takes the form of an arresting allegory of faith, an 
allegory that depends on the possibility that the play's Jesus is actually divined. 
The Possibility of a Divine Jesus 
The possibility of a divine Jesus in Caifas may seem surprising, particularly 
given the play's scandalous re-imagination of Jesus' passion. Nevertheless, 
the play contains several clues suggesting that Caiaphas' "big lie" may actually 
be true. The first such clue appears, as has already been mentioned, in the 
prologue. Specifically, the newly widowed Martha sends a boy to ask Jesus 
to come and raise her husband from the dead. The boy returns quickly because 
Jesus was apparently coming already. The scene strongly suggests that Jesus 
knew Martha needed him before the boy asked. 
Other clues suggesting the Jesus character's divinity appear in the 
behavior of Judas Iscariot. Judas first appears when he interrupts a 
conversation between Caiaphas and Saul, the assistant priest. Caiaphas has 
just told Saul that perhaps the Fall of Adam is simply a myth designed to 
make people think God is just "in spite of all appearances to the contrary" 
(Martinez 42). At that moment, Judas appears. He tells Caiaphas that Jesus 
has committed blasphemy and should therefore be punished. Uninterested, 
Caiaphas answers that Jesus is simply one in a long line of false prophets. 
"But this one is more important. This one does miracles," Judas responds 
(45). Furthermore, Judas continues, he can deliver Jesus for thirty pieces of 
silver. Both this statement and others Judas makes suggest that Jesus satisfies 
messianic prophecies: 
JUDAS: All I ask is thirty pieces of silver. It's not much. The 
priest smiles and turns to look at Caiaphas. 
Caiaphas understands immediately and bursts 
into laughter. 





CAIAPHAS: Ha! Ha! Ha! I get it now. Thirty pieces of silver! 
Just like the scriptures prophesy, right? 
I don't understand. I just... 
Sure, all you want is thirty pieces of silver for handing 
this man over to me. You know there's a prophecy 
in Psalms or Jeremiah... 
Right. Jeremiah... 
In Jeremiah it says that the Messiah will be handed 
over for that amount, and you have taken it upon 
yourself to make sure that the prophecy is fulfilled 
with this.. Jesus. You're doing it so he'll look like 
the Messiah, right? 
I don't understand you, Your Excellency. 
Tell me. How you would you point him out to me? A 
kiss, perhaps? 
Disconcerted. Well, yes. 
Transition. You must love him a great deal to 
sacrifice yourself for him like this. Because I 
suppose you know the rest of the prophecy as well. 
Love him? No. You don't understand. I just want 
him punished. It's not much, thirty pieces of silver. 
Probing. And if I give you fifty? 
Thirty would be enough, Your Excellency. 
Yes, yes, of course. I understand you very well. I'm 
sorry, but I won't be a party to your little game. To 
himself. To actually come to me with this! That 
they'd actually go so far as to...Incredulously, to 
Judas. Tell me. Is this man willing to die like the 
prophecies say? Judas does not answer. Caiaphas 
takes his silence to be an affirmative response. 
He talks to himself again. My people certainly are 
a strange lot! To Judas. Well. Go on now. Get out! 
You didn't actually think I'd take you up on this, did 
you? (47-49) 
But Caiaphas calls Judas back. Caiaphas does so because he sees that he 
can create a myth to replace the Adam myth he now distrusts. Believing that 
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CAIAPHAS: And this man, have the prophecies been fulfilled in 
him? What I mean is, can you make his life fit the 
prophecies? 
PRIEST: Smiling sarcastically. The lives of all of them do, 
Master. Caiaphas pays no attention to him. 
JUDAS: Yes, Your Excellency. It's a strange coincidence. 
(50) 
The foregoing suggests that Jesus may have fulfilled messianic prophecies 
even before Caiaphas becomes involved. Indeed, notwithstanding the assistant 
priest's wry comment, Judas affirms that Jesus' life fits the prophecies. 
Furthermore, Judas himself unwittingly fulfills prophecy by seeking thirty 
pieces of silver and planning to identify Jesus with a kiss. The play thus 
indicates that some prophecies are fulfilled without Caiaphas' intervention. 
A scene near the end of the play makes this point rather humorously. 
The scene once again involves Judas, a rather dim-witted character who 
never understands that Caiaphas believes they are co-conspirators in a 
Messiah gambit. In the scene, Caiaphas asks Judas if Jesus' followers know 
the scriptures sufficiently well to satisfy all messianic prophecies, including 
"the resurrection, the great storm, the tunic, and the veil of the temple" (76-
77). Confused, Judas says he does not understand. Caiaphas then gets angry: 
CAIAPHAS: Idiot! Don't you know I'm with you, that we're 
working for the same cause?...No matter how 
prepared you people are, you can't possibly have 
my experience in questions of religion or know the 
scriptures as well as I do. For example, you know 
that you must kill yourself tonight, don't you? 
JUDAS: Backing away and shaking his head. No. No. 
CAIAPHAS: Come back, you idiot! Don't go! At least tell me...! 
Come back, I'm telling you! I command it! 
JUDAS: From outside, among the crowd, his voice can 
be heard. He shouts. Take back your money, 
Caiaphas! I repent of what I've done! Take it back! 
He throws the bag of money to Caiaphas. 
CAIAPHAS: Smiling and picking up the bag, he talks to 
himself in a low voice. You repent, do you? And 
this. That's right; I'd forgotten. That's the way it's 
written. Feeling the weight of the bag in his hand. 
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Off to the potter's field. I guess you people know 
your scriptures after all. (77-78) 
While Judas' words and actions imply that he is unconsciously fulfilling 
prophecy, another witness to the Jesus character's possible divinity is God 
himself. Two "miracles" support this conclusion. First, a storm suddenly 
appears during Jesus' crucifixion. While Caiaphas had been hoping for such 
a storm (due to prophecy), he had begun to lose hope as the day turned clear. 
The sudden storm, however, relieves his fears. Saul, the priest, says that the 
storm "looks like a miracle" (79). The second miracle occurs at the very end 
of the play. In the final scene, Saul's remorse about helping to promote the 
big lie makes him turn against Caiaphas. Saul angrily demands a divine sign 
showing that God approves of the big lie. If no sign appears, Saul threatens, 
he is going to tell the people the truth. Seconds later, a sign appears in the 
person of Martha. As noted previously, she enters the temple to complain 
about her son's death. She leaves, however, saying "Now I see! Oh, forgive 
me, Lord!" (95). This "miracle" convinces Saul that the big lie has had its 
intended effect. Indeed, Saul is so convinced that he accepts Caiaphas' 
command to masquerade as a missionary for the Christian cause. 
The foregoing demonstrates that one can make a strong case for 
Jesus' divinity in the world of the play. Admittedly, none of the points supporting 
that case is free of ambiguity. Specifically, one can argue that Jesus just 
happens to be coming down Martha's road when she needs him, that the 
miracles Judas reports are not really miracles, that Jesus just happens to fit 
the messianic prophecies (like other charlatans, as the priest Saul says), that 
Judas just happens to act out the prophesied traitor's role, that a storm just 
happens to occur during Jesus' death, and that Martha just happens to appear 
when Saul asks for a sign showing divine approval of the big lie. All of these 
events could simply be coincidental. But, of course, they may not be 
coincidental at all. 
B. An Allegory of Existential Faith and Agency 
Because Caifas provides no unambiguous proof of Jesus' divinity, 
faith is required to conclude that the play's Jesus is indeed the Messiah. This 
need for faith provides an answer to Althusser. Specifically, as noted above, 
Althusser claims that subjectivity is illusory. Ideology creates that illusion, 
says Althusser, to mask the real "relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence" (36). If Althusser is right about subjectivity being 
illusory, then the agency necessary for living an existentially authentic life is 
likewise illusory. For Althusser, therefore, the existential redemption advocated 
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in Caifas is impossible. The possibility that the play's Jesus really is the Son 
of God, however, suggests that God has intervened in human life to make 
authenticity possible. In other words, Caifas provides an allegorical account 
of human agency. According to Caifas, humans seize agency through faith 
that they can create a meaningful relationship to the conditions of their 
existence. 
While the Jesus character's possible divinity provides an allegory of 
faith and agency, that divinity simultaneously raises a question about agency. 
Specifically, if Caiaphas and Judas were simply following a divine plan, how 
could they have any agency at all? This question raises the age-old debate 
concerning the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human 
freedom. But José de Jesús Martínez, a Marxist and an avowed atheist 
(Greene 47), is not writing a theological tract. For that reason, an interpretation 
limiting Jesus' role to the allegorical one suggested above is most convincing. 
In the play, Caiaphas recognizes the potential irony of his situation; 
indeed, he explicitly considers the possibility that Jesus was divine. In a 
conversation with Saul, Caiaphas describes his thoughts about this matter: 
If that Nazarene really had been the Son of God, would I have killed 
him? Would I have killed him, Saul? Because I love God, but I also 
love my people. And it pains me to see them suffer and die so 
miserably. They are good, genuinely good. They are works of God. 
They are made one by one, with kisses and embraces, with love, 
during the moment when husband and wife care for each other most. 
Isn't it our duty to plead for them, to be their advocates? Isn't it our 
duty to avenge their misery? I don't know what I'd have done if that 
Nazarene really had been the Son of God. It's pure fantasy to think 
about it, but I don't know what I would have done. Let's simply be 
thankful that he was a charlatan and that we've sacrificed him for 
the glory of God and the good of men. (80) 
While Caiaphas claims here that he does not know what he would have 
done, he protests too much. Indeed, Caiaphas repeatedly says throughout 
the play that he knows exactly what he is doing. In particular, he says so 
three times in a row when Saul questions his plan. Caiaphas' certainty reflects 
his faith that he can create meaning both for himself and for his people. 
Conclusion 
Caifas' strong claim for human agency is similar to that of many 
existentialist works. Indeed, without the play's divine Jesus, Caifas would be 
94 LATIN AMERICAN THEATRE REVIEW 
practically indistinguishable from Sartre's plays. José de Jesús Martínez would 
certainly have been familiar with Sartre's attempt to reconcile existentialism 
and Marxism in Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). In that work and 
others, Sartre advanced a strong claim for human freedom within historical 
and social situations (Guignon 497). Sartre's claim, however, was not based 
on the humanist premise that "the human subject is immediately present to 
itself as a center of thought and action" (Guignon 500). Rather, Sartre and 
other existentialists assumed "a relation of mutual permeability between 
subjectivity and its surrounding world" (Kruks 11). The subjectivity embodied 
by this view is neither transparent (humanist) nor constructed (anti-humanist). 
Rather, it occupies a middle ground of "situated subjectivity." This situated 
subjectivity offers a response to anti-humanists, like Althusser, who have 
decentered subjectivity such that they cannot account for "the kind of critical 
thinking they see as central to the postmodern stance" (Guignon 501). 
The argument for "situated subjectivity" finds expression in Caifas. 
Most importantly, however, the play creates an allegory of faith, embodied in 
the character of Jesus. That faith concerns the possibility of exercising agency 
and finding redemption from an otherwise meaningless life. In Caifas, 
characters show that redemption, authenticity, comes only through faith that 
by exercising agency, they can establish a meaningful relationship with the 
conditions of their existence. What those conditions are is irrelevant. For 
Caifas, characters' attitude, their faith, makes agency and authentic life 
possible. 
Brigham Young University 
Notes 
1
 All quotations from the play are my translations. 
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